Member states have been flaunting EU rules lately. France has been illegally fishing. Italy is violating the growth and stability pact even after the rules were made less restrictive because France, Germany, and Portugal were violating the orginal rules. Greece appears to have lied about its economy to qualify for membership in the common currency. Spain can't keep its bathing waters clean. Overall, the number of infringement cases brought before the ECJ is up nearly 15%. And the ECJ and the Commission are taking notice with larger fines and harsher language, but it does not seem to be having the effect of making member state's commitment to EU rules any more credible. What's the deal? The EU has a problem making credible commitments and it isn't just because national governments are scared of losing voters. Its because of the democratic deficit.
It might be easy to look at all this rule flaunting in the isolation of domestic politics. In most cases, there are large domestic constituencies that make enforcing certain EU rules uncomfortable for national governments. For example, the Fisheries industry in France has made France weary of enforcing EU rules regarding the size of fish caught in EU waters. This "two-level" game is a common feature of international relations involving democratic governments. However, the relationship between the EU and its member states does not fit this model. Member states have agreed to abide by rules that do not have to be agreed to by domestic constituencies. This is one source of the democratic deficit. And it has member state governments running scared.
The trouble is that the willingness of Member States to violate EU rules is no longer a factor of being unable to sell a particular policy to a key constituency back home. Instead, it has become a factor of being unable to sell multiple policies to almost all constituencies back home. EU governments are scared of enforcing rules that effect small, but vocal constituencies for fear that these constituencies will unite to defeat the government' larger policy agendas and the integration project itself. The public is getting wise to this and it is not surprising that the EU Constitution went down in flames in France. All the groups who are losing out on specific policies are no longer placated by the universal benefits offered by integration, and they want the original "two-level" game reopened. The longer national governments resist fundamental changes to the structure of the EU, the greater the number of rule violations the Commission will find because member states can no longer make a credible commitment to enforcing EU rules.
It might be easy to look at all this rule flaunting in the isolation of domestic politics. In most cases, there are large domestic constituencies that make enforcing certain EU rules uncomfortable for national governments. For example, the Fisheries industry in France has made France weary of enforcing EU rules regarding the size of fish caught in EU waters. This "two-level" game is a common feature of international relations involving democratic governments. However, the relationship between the EU and its member states does not fit this model. Member states have agreed to abide by rules that do not have to be agreed to by domestic constituencies. This is one source of the democratic deficit. And it has member state governments running scared.
The trouble is that the willingness of Member States to violate EU rules is no longer a factor of being unable to sell a particular policy to a key constituency back home. Instead, it has become a factor of being unable to sell multiple policies to almost all constituencies back home. EU governments are scared of enforcing rules that effect small, but vocal constituencies for fear that these constituencies will unite to defeat the government' larger policy agendas and the integration project itself. The public is getting wise to this and it is not surprising that the EU Constitution went down in flames in France. All the groups who are losing out on specific policies are no longer placated by the universal benefits offered by integration, and they want the original "two-level" game reopened. The longer national governments resist fundamental changes to the structure of the EU, the greater the number of rule violations the Commission will find because member states can no longer make a credible commitment to enforcing EU rules.
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